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ARTICLES
THE HAITIAN REFUGEE LITIGATION: A CASE STUDY IN
TRANSNATIONAL PUBLIC LAW LITIGATION
HAROLD HONGJU KOH*
In reading about the history behind this lecture series, I was struck
by how Lawrence I. Gerber is described: as a man "born in New York
City of -immigrant parents" who went on to attend City College and
NYU Law School, who "loved the law and remained faithful to it
through 60 years of practice." His, in short, was the story of the Amer-
ican dream, a dream that all of us have shared-of a nation of immi-
grants and law, of hope, struggle, and ultimately, promise fulfilled.
I could not read about Mr. Gerber without also thinking about my
own parents. I, too, was born of immigrant parents, not in New York,
but in Boston. My father, the late Kwang Lim Koh, was a Korean
international law professor. In 1960, he was appointed Deputy Chief of
Mission at the Embassy of the Republic of Korea in Washington, D.C.,
and served the first freely elected democratic government in that na-
tion's history. But his time in office was short. Less than a year later,
his government was overthrown by military coup. After my father be-
came a political exile, we took refuge in New Haven, Connecticut,
where my parents began teaching at the Yale Law School. With a few
detours, that is where I have been ever since.
Like Lawrence Gerber, my father's life was both marked by pain
and guided by a dream. His pain came from knowing that America is a
racist society; that this country's legal traditions include Korematsu v.
* Gerard C. and Bernice Latrobe Smith Professor of International Law and Di-
rector of the Orville H. Schell, Jr., Center for International Human Rights, Yale Uni-
versity; Counsel of Record for the Haitian refugees in Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council,
113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993) and 823 F. Supp. 1028 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
This paper was prepared for delivery as the annual Gerber Memorial Lecture,
presented on September 29, 1993 at the University of Maryland School of Law. I have
edited and adapted it in small respects. In preparing this lecture, I have drawn upon
earlier writings, notably Reflections on Refoulement and Haitian Centers Council, 35
HARV. INT'L L.J. 1 (1994) [hereafter Koh, Reflections], and The Human Face of the
Haitian Interdiction Program, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 483 (1993).
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United States,1 Dred Scott,2 the Chinese Exclusion Case3 and Plessy v.
Ferguson;4 that this is a land where people of color have been denied
equal opportunity and equal justice, and where aliens have been
shunned as outsiders. But while he lived, I rarely heard my father talk
about the pain. Instead, he spoke of the dream, his dream of equal
justice, of a world under law. Like Lawrence Gerber, he "loved the law
and tried to remain faithful to it."
Two vignettes capture my father's immigrant faith in the law. I
remember the day when his government was overthrown and we real-
ized that he might never return home. We were inconsolable, but he
said to us, "Don't worry. This is a nation of refugees, a nation built by
immigrants. What it says on the Statute of Liberty are not just words,
but a sacred promise, and that promise will protect us." Fourteen years
later, when I was a college student, visiting Korea for the summer,
Richard Nixon resigned and Gerald Ford became President. At the
same time, someone tried to assassinate Korea's President, the Presi-
dent's wife was killed, martial law was declared, and tanks rolled in the
streets. I called home, terrified, and asked, "How is it that the most
powerful country in the world can pass power from one leader to an-
other without incident, while this tiny country cannot do the same
without violence and bloodshed?" To which my father responded:
"Now you understand the difference between the United States and
Korea. In the United States, if you are President, then you control the
military. But Korea is a place where if you control the military, then
you are President. That is the difference between a government of laws
and a government of men." When I became a law professor, my father
reminded me that lawyers should be servants of principle and not polit-
ics. "If you can remember that," he seemed to say, "your existence will
be proof that the dream is stronger than the pain."
What I have just recounted is the story of two families, the
Gerbers and my own. But over the last two years, as I have litigated on
behalf of Haitian refugees, I have come to see their story as the same:
the same dashed hope of democracy, the search for refuge, the struggle
between principle and power, the difference between a rule of law and
a rule of individuals.
1. 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (allowing confinement of Japanese-American citizens in
World War II internment camps).
2. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856) (persons can be prop-
erty within the meaning of the Constitution).
3. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (suggesting that Con-
gress has power, without constitutional limit, to control immigration).
4. 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (approving "separate but equal" doctrine).
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I. THE LOWENSTEIN CLINIC
For me the story began in 1991 at Yale Law School, where I teach
international law, international human rights, Foreign Affairs and the
Constitution, and civil procedure. I had just published an article in the
Yale Law Journal that posited a theory about the growing convergence
of domestic and international law. In that article, called Transnational
Public Law Litigation,5 I argued that a transnational analog is emerg-
ing to the now-familiar domestic phenomenon of "public law litiga-
tion." We all know how civil rights lawyers have invoked principles of
American public law against government officials to seek judicial re-
form of prisons, hospitals, and school systems.' These cases-typified
by Thurgood Marshall's great struggle in Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion 7-are also part of the American dream. My modest contribution
was to suggest that such suits are no longer limited to domestic
problems. Increasingly, private litigants are turning to U.S. courts to
enforce international human rights norms against government officials:
both foreigners who commit torture, genocide, and terrorism at home,"
and U.S. government officials when they act in violation of internation-
ally recognized standards.9 In closing, I argued that transnational pub-
lic law litigation represents a positive development, designed to further
the protection of international human rights and to return U.S. courts
to their proper, but neglected role, as guardians of international law in
a "new international legal process." The success of this kind of litiga-
tion, I argued, will be measured not by judgments or damage awards,
but by political results-the norms that are declared, the political pres-
sure that these suits generate, the government practices that are estab-
lished and abated, and ultimately, by the human lives that are posi-
tively affected.
Fine academic thoughts, but as I subsequently learned, when you
talk enough, someone will ask you to put your money where your
mouth is. In my case, those who asked were Yale law students, who
wondered whether I would be willing to teach an international human
rights clinic that would actually do transnational public law litigation.
In time-honored professorial fashion, I told them I was too busy and
5. 100 YALE L.J. 2347 (1991).
6. See generally Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation,
89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976).
7. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
8. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
9. See, e.g., Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Garcia-
Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 889 (1986).
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that they should go away.
But they persisted and soon thereafter, the Allard K. Lowenstein
International Human Rights Clinic was born. We named it after Al
Lowenstein, a political activist and Yale Law graduate who had served
as U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Human Rights Commission in the
Carter Administration. 10 I agreed to teach the course along with
Michael Ratner, a superb, seasoned human rights lawyer from the
Center for Constitutional Rights in New York. In our first semesters
together, we filed lawsuits against the former Defense Minister of Gua-
temala, Hector Gramajo, for his actions against Kanjobal Indians in
the Western highlands1" and amicus curiae briefs in a Ninth Circuit
case involving Ferdinand Marcos 2 and in several human rights cases at
the Supreme Court."
Our very first suit was brought in the Southern District of Florida,
against Prosper Avril, the former dictator of Haiti."' Under the aus-
pices of the United States government, Avril had fled Haiti and come
to Florida, and was living there in a large house and with several bank
accounts. After we sued him, he fled and apparently defaulted. But
before doing so, he filed defensive pleas of head-of-state immunity and
foreign sovereign immunity. To surmount these claims, we contacted
the newly elected democratic government of Haiti, led by President
Jean-Bertrand Aristide, which had just been elected with 67% of the
vote, and persuaded it to file a formal waiver of Avril's immunities.
In that moment, I saw how similar this democratically elected
Haitian government was to the Korean government my own father had
served. The intense excitement that the Haitians felt about their new
republic was matched only by their intense heartbreak in the fall of
10. For a recent biography, see WILLIAM H. CHAFE, NEVER STOP RUNNING: AL-
LARD LOWENSTEIN AND THE STRUGGLE TO SAVE AMERICAN LIBERALISM (1993). The
Clinic originated as an arm of the Allard K. Lowenstein International Human Rights
Project, a student-run organization founded at Yale Law School in 1981 to educate
and inspire law students, scholars, practicing attorneys, and policy makers in the de-
fense of international human rights. For the Clinic's account of the Haitian litigation,
written while the case was still proceeding, see The Lowenstein International Human
Rights Clinic, Aliens and the Duty of Nonrefoulement: Haitian Centers Council v.
McNary, 6 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1 (1993).
11. Xuncax v. Gramajo, No. 91-11564WD (D. Mass. filed June 6, 1991).
12. Trajano v. Estate of Marcos, 978 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1992); Trajano, 878 F.2d
1439 (9th Cir. 1989).
13. See Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428
(1989); Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 113 S. Ct. 1471 (1993); United States v. Alvarez-
Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992); Jaffe v. Snow, No. 93-241 (reviewing 610 So.2d 482
(1992)).
14. Paul v. Avril, 812 F. Supp. 207 (S.D. Fla. 1993).
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1991 when Aristide's government was overthrown by military coup.
Shortly thereafter, boatloads of refugees began to come. Following an
executive order issued by President Ronald Reagan in 1981,15 the
Coast Guard "interdicted" fleeing Haitians on the high seas and sum-
marily interviewed them, initially bringing to the United States those
"screened-in" Haitians who could demonstrate a "credible fear" of po-
litical persecution, while returning the rest to Haiti. As more boats
came, however, the government began taking all screened-in Haitians
to the U.S. Naval Base in Guantanamo, Cuba and detained them in
military camps behind razor barbed wire without due process rights of
any kind.
In November 1991, the Haitian Refugee Center (HRC) brought
suit in the Southern District of Florida challenging the government's
practice of returning screened-out Haitians. 6 During the frenzy of liti-
gation that ensued, some of our students volunteered to do research for
the understaffed plaintiffs. In February 1992, the case culminated in a
denial of HRC's petition for certiorari by the Supreme Court, with
only Justice Blackmun dissenting. 17 Little did we realize that vote fore-
shadowed events still to come.
II. PHASE ONE: RIGHT TO COUNSEL
At that moment, some 3,000 Haitians were being held incommuni-
cado behind barbed wire at the U.S. Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba. Virtually all had been found to have credible fears of political
persecution and some had already established full-fledged claims of po-
litical asylum. In early March, we learned from sources on Guanta-
namo that the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) was
planning to reinterview the Haitians held there and to send those who
failed the test of political asylum back to Haiti to face possible persecu-
tion and death. These brief adversarial confrontations would be con-
ducted without lawyers present. Thus, the Haitians were expected to
defend themselves without documentary proof of their refugee status
(for most had fled with only the clothes on their backs), without law-
yers, in a foreign language, and under a legal system that they simply
did not understand.
Our case began as a simple application of the principles of Gideon
15. Exec. Order No. 12,324, 46 Fed. Reg. 48,109 (1981).
16. Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498 (11 th Cir., 1992), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 1245 (1992).
17. Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Baker, 112 S. Ct. 1245 (1992).
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v. Wainwright, 8 that a client has a right to a lawyer in what is essen-
tially a capital case. We prepared papers and filed for a temporary
restraining order (TRO) before Judge Sterling Johnson, Jr., in the
Eastern District of New York. As co-counsel, we recruited Joseph
Tringali, a talented antitrust lawyer from the firm of Simpson, Thacher
& Bartlett; Lucas Guttentag, the gifted Director of the Immigrants'
Rights project at the ACLU in New York; and Robert Rubin, an ex-
perienced refugee lawyer from the San Francisco Lawyers' Committee
for Civil Rights. At the heart of the clinic was a group of Yale Law
students that ultimately numbered about seventy, a multicultural coali-
tion that included Asians, Hispanics, African-Americans, Jews, gays,
straights, and white Southerners-Americans of every extraction. Dur-
ing the next year and a half, these students logged more than 28,000
hours for people that they had never met.
We sued initially for principle: the simple notion that lawyers and
clients have a right to talk to each other before the clients are sent
back to possible persecution and death in Haiti. But calling this claim
"frivolous," the government filed for Rule 11 sanctions against us, 19 at
the same time demanding that we post a $10 million bond, the largest
bond ever requested on a TRO in the history of the New York federal
courts.2" We suddenly realized that we were not in Kansas anymore.
Until then, our clinic had never litigated a contested case; our cases
had consisted of amicus briefs and default judgments. If we would be
subject to Rule 11 sanctions if we lost, we decided, we had no choice
but to win.
Three days after the Rule 11 sanctions motion was filed, Judge
Johnson awarded us a temporary restraining order and set a date five
days hence for a hearing on the preliminary injunction. 2' During those
five days, we were to complete all preliminary discovery. We immedi-
ately sent a group of students to Miami with Lucas Guttentag to inter-
view Haitian refugees and depose INS officials. We sent another team
to Washington, D.C. with Michael Ratner and Joe Tringali to take
depositions of INS and State Department officials. A third team of
lawyers, translators, court reporter and students, headed by Robert
Rubin, flew to Guantanamo to interview our named plaintiffs and to
take their depositions. Finally, a group that stayed behind processed
18. 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (requiring right to counsel in criminal cases).
19. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
20. By way of comparison, the court required only a $1 million TRO bond in
Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil, Co., 626 F. Supp. 250 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), the case that con-
cluded with the largest civil settlement in history.
21. 789 F. Supp. 541 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
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the information we were learning and wrote a one-hundred page pre-
liminary injunction brief. Four days later, we gathered in New York
and argued the preliminary injunction motion before Judge Johnson.
The government sent the Deputy Associate Attorney General to argue
for their side. After a hearing that lasted more than four hours, we won
a preliminary injunction granting screened-in Haitians at Guantanamo
a right to counsel before being reinterviewed and returned to Haiti.22
But that was only the beginning. During the next two weeks, the
government unsuccessfully sought stays of Judge Johnson's ruling at
the district court, at the Second Circuit, at the district court and at the
circuit court again. Then incredibly, less than two weeks after the suit
began, the government won a stay of our preliminary injunction at the
Supreme Court by a vote of five to four.2" The next morning, the gov-
ernment returned some eighty-nine of our "screened-in" clients to Haiti
because they would not participate in asylum hearings without lawyers
present.
The pace of this first litigation phase was unbelievably intense. My
last oral argument had been in law school moot court fifteen years ear-
lier. But over the next year and a half that changed, as our case went
to the Second Circuit six times and the Supreme Court eight times.
Several times, we filed pleadings at the district, circuit and Supreme
Court on the same day. On one occasion, I argued a stay motion by
conference call, while standing at a maitre d's station at a hotel near
Grand Central Station, while Michael Ratner participated by mobile
phone from the bleachers at Shea Stadium.
Round one ended in the early summer of 1992, when the Second
Circuit affirmed our preliminary injunction granting the Haitians ac-
cess to counsel. 24 The government petitioned the Supreme Court for
certiorari and summary reversal.
How did these rulings affect our clients? One of our named plain-
tiffs, "Mr. Bertrand" (a pseudonym), had found his mother killed in
Haiti because of his political work. He fled on a boat and was stopped
by the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard burned the boat and his posses-
sions and took him to Guantanamo, where he was held for months be-
hind barbed wire. There, he became the leader of a group that called
itself "The Association for Haitian Political Exiles." When he learned
22. Haitian Ctrs. Council v. McNary, No. 92 CV-1258, 1992 WL 155853
(E.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 1992).
23. Haitian Ctrs. Council v. McNary, 112 S. Ct. 1714 (1992) (Blackmun,
O'Connor, Souter, Stevens, JJ., dissenting).
24. Haitian Ctrs. Council v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1992), vacated as
moot, 113 S. Ct. 3028 (1993).
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of our lawsuit and our preliminary injunction granting him a right to
counsel, he refused to submit to INS interviews without a lawyer pre-
sent. But when the Supreme Court stayed our injunction in April 1992,
the U.S. government ordered him to undergo an interview without a
lawyer present. When he refused, he was put on a boat and sent back
to Haiti. When he arrived at Port-au-Prince, he was forced off the boat
with a fire hose, fingerprinted and photographed by the Haitian police.
That night, several soldiers appeared at his house, beat him savagely,
and broke his shoulder and collarbone. He fled into hiding, where he
remains. But had the United States not returned him, he would have
won the benefit of our later court rulings, been paroled into the United
States in June 1993, and would be living here today.
I11. PHASE Two: THE RIGHT OF NON-RETURN
The second phase of the case began on Memorial Day, 1992, when
President George Bush changed the interdiction policy and began forci-
bly returning all Haitians to Haiti without any hearings whatsoever.2 5
By this time, we had organized ourselves into an ad hoc law firm, pre-
pared to deal with almost any eventuality. We had divided the students
into a procedural team, to handle stays, injunctions, and other proce-
dural motions; a case management team to handle document discovery,
electronic file management, and E-mail; several research teams, each
responsible for a different substantive legal count of the complaint; a
document discovery team, to handle attorney-client privilege and work-
product issues; and a "spin-control" team to handle press and lobbying.
When the new executive order was issued from President Bush's
vacation home, our spin-control team immediately dubbed it the "Ken-
nebunkport Order." We decided to label the new policy "the Floating
Berlin Wall," to convey that its purpose was not to prevent people from
coming to the United States, but to prevent Haitians from leaving Ha-
iti by boat." The new policy reminded us not of Gideon v. Wainwright,
25. Exec. Order No. 12,807, 57 Fed. Reg. 23,133 (1992).
26. We continued to press this point all the way to the Supreme Court. See Tran-
script of Oral Argument in No. 92-344, Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council (Mar. 2, 1993)
at 11 (Oral Argument of Harold Hongju Koh on Behalf of the Respondents) [hereafter
Transcript]:
[Tihe right we claim is not a right of entry. It's simply the right not to be
returned to Haiti, a country where our clients face political persecution. These
interdictions are going on over 700 miles away from the United States. They
are going on right outside Haiti. People are fleeing from Haiti to anywhere
they can get to.
There are some 700 islands, if you refer to a map, between here and
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but of the voyage of the St. Louis, a boat that came in 1939 from Nazi
Germany and sought refuge in the United States.27 It was turned away
from New York and Miami, and then returned to Europe, where many
of its passengers later died in the gas chambers. As we watched with
disbelief, our president went one step further. He ordered the return of
Haitians directly to their persecutors, thereby making our Coast Guard
de facto agents of a Haitian regime that we had ourselves called
illegitimate.
The Kennebunkport Order came down on Yale's graduation day.
Our student leaders literally took off their graduation robes, and went
back to work on another temporary restraining order. Three days later
we were back before the district court, this time opposed by the Solici-
tor General of the United States. 8 Within a month, we had once again
prevailed before the Second Circuit, our second circuit court victory in
this "frivolous" case.29 This time the Second Circuit held that the new
Bush policy violated Section 243(h) of the Immigration and National-
ity Act, part of the Refugee Act of 1980, which directs in plain lan-
guage that "the Attorney General shall not deport or return any alien.
. to a country if the Attorney General determines that such alien's life
or freedom would be threatened in such country on account of [his] ...
political opinion."30 That directive, the court found, mirrors the lan-
guage of the 1951 U.N. Refugee Convention, which mandates in Arti-
cle 33 that "[n]o Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a
refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where
his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his . . . political
Haiti. People coming from Port-au-Prince could go to the Bahamas. They
could go to the Caymans. They can go to Mexico, Cuba, the Virgin Islands,
Honduras, Turks and Caicos, the Dominican Republic, but they cannot be-
cause we've erected a floating Berlin Wall around Haiti which keeps people
in.
27. See GORDON THOMAS & MAX MORGAN WITTS, VOYAGE OF THE DAMNED
(1974).
28. Judge Johnson ruled against our request for injunctive relief, but wrote,
"[t]his court is astonished that the United States would return Haitian refugees to the
jaws of political persecution, terror, death and uncertainty when it has contracted not
to do so." Haitian Ctrs. Council v. McNary, No. 92 CV-1258, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
8452, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. June 5, 1992).
29. Haitian Ctrs. Council v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350 (2d Cir. 1992). Shortly after
winning our second Second Circuit victory, we advised the Justice Department that if it
did not drop its Rule 11 motion against us, we would move for Rule 11 sanctions
against it, for filing a frivolous Rule 11 motion. After negotiations, the Department
dropped its motion.
30. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (1988) (emphasis added).
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opinion." 31
The day after we won at the Second Circuit, presidential candi-
date Bill Clinton issued a statement praising the Second Circuit for
making the
right decision in overturning the Bush administration's cruel
policy of returning Haitian refugees to a brutal dictatorship
without an asylum hearing. The Bush administration is wrong
to deny Haitian refugees the right to make their case for politi-
cal asylum. We respect the right of refugees from other parts of
the world to apply for political asylum, and Haitians should not
be treated differently.3 2
Suddenly, we had hope. If we could just keep the case alive until Clin-
ton was elected, we could preserve our circuit court wins in both halves
of the case.
But in January 1993, to our utter disbelief, President-elect Clinton
31. 19 U.S.T. 6259, 6275, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, done July 28, 1951 (emphasis
added). The United States became a party to the Refugee Convention by virtue of its
1968 accession to the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 19
U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. 6577, done, Jan. 11, 1967; entered into force Oct. 4, 1967.
32. Statement by Bill Clinton on Decision by U.S. Court of Appeals: Bush Ad-
ministration Policy is Illegal, U.S. Newswire, July 29, 1992, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Currnt File. That statement echoed Governor Clinton's declaration only
three days after the Kennebunkport Order issued:
I am appalled by the decision of Bush administration to pick up fleeing
Haitians on the high seas and forcibly return them to Haiti before considering
their claim to political asylum. It was bad enough when there were failures to
offer them due process in making such a claim. Now they are offered no pro-
cess at all before being returned.
This policy must not stand. It is a blow to the principle of first asylum
and to America's moral authority in defending the rights of refugees around
the world. This most recent policy shift is another sad example of the admin-
istration's callous response to a terrible human tragedy.
Statement of Governor Bill Clinton on Haitian Refugees, U.S. Newswire, May 27,
1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File (emphasis added). While the
government's petition for certiorari was pending, Governor Clinton issued another
statement "reaffirm[ing] my opposition to the Bush administration's cruel policy of re-
turning Haitian refugees to their oppressors in Haiti without a fair hearing for political
asylum." Governor Clinton Reaffirms Opposition to Bush Administration's Policy on
Haiti, U.S. Newswire, Sept. 9, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File.
Moreover, Bill Clinton's & Al Gore's PUTTING PEOPLE FIRST: How WE CAN ALL
CHANGE AMERICA clearly stated the incoming Administration's intent to "Stop the
Forced Repatriation of Haitian Refugees-Reverse Bush Administration policy, and
oppose repatriation." Id. at 119 (1992).
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reneged on both promises and chose to defend in court both Bush poli-
cies-the return of the Haitians directly to Haiti and the continued
imprisonment of the Guantanamo Haitians without counsel.33 Even
more shocking, he adopted the Bush Administration's briefs and legal
rationale: that Haitians outside the United States have no legal rights
against the United States government, even though our government
had seized them, taken them into custody, and had held them behind
barbed wire in some cases for more than a year.
Wearily, we put together our effort at the Supreme Court. We
divided the issues in the case and developed twelve amicus briefs in
support of our claims. Among those who filed on our side were former
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance; former Attorneys General Nicholas
Katzenbach, Griffin Bell, and Ben Civiletti; every major international
human rights and refugee group; the Association of the Bar of the City
of New York; the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees;
the members of Congress who had drafted the Refugee Act of 1980;
and the NAACP.3' Our position before the Supreme Court was simple:
plain language and the object and purpose of the treaty. In essence,
both the statute and the treaty said, "thou shalt not return any aliens
to their persecutors." Neither required that the United States let the
Haitians in, but once our government took them into custody, the
United States could not return them to those they were fleeing.
Our government responded that these laws did not apply on the
high seas. But if that were true, then if the United States had seen the
Jews coming on the St. Louis in 1939, it could have picked them up on
the high seas and intentionally returned them to the Nazi gas cham-
bers. The German government, by this argument, could intercept flee-
ing Bosnians on the Adriatic and deliberately return them to Serbian
death camps. And if he came here by boat, President Aristide-by any
measure a political refugee-could be forcibly and summarily returned
into the hands of the Haitian military.
33. Remarkably, even after his election, the President-elect had stated:
[W]ith regard to the Haitians, I think my position on that has been pretty
clear all along. I believe that there is a legitimate distinction between politi-
cal and economic refugees. But I think that we should have a process in which
these Haitians get a chance to make their case. I think that the blanket send-
ing them back to Haiti under the circumstances which have prevailed for the
last year was an error and so I will modify that process.
I Intend to Look Beyond Partisanship . . . to Help Guide Our Nation, WASH. POST,
Nov. 13, 1992, at A10 (emphasis added).
34. For a description of each of these briefs, see Koh, Reflections, supra note *, at
10-13.
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IV. PHASE THREE: AN HIV-CONCENTRATION CAMP
On March 2, 1993, I argued the non-return phase of the case
before the Supreme Court. Six days later we moved to phase three: a
two-week bench trial before Judge Johnson on whether our preliminary
injunction granting a right to counsel should be made permanent. At
that point, the number of screened-in Haitians held on Guantanamo
had dwindled to little more than 300. Even without legal representa-
tion, most of them had developed well-founded fears of political perse-
cution. Nevertheless, they continued to be held because our government
believed them to have the HIV virus, based on what we thought were
inadequate medical tests.
By March, the group had been there for nearly a year and a half,
living in squalid conditions without toilets, beds, or any semblance of
privacy. The group included several dozen children, including unac-
companied minors who were wandering about the camp without super-
vision. It included babies who had lived their entire lives behind U.S.
barbed wire, people with T-cell counts below 200 whose immune sys-
tems were effectively destroyed, and a man with both infectious tuber-
culosis and pneumonia, who was "too sick to be moved," but hence left
in the company of hundreds of other immuno-suppressed people. The
group included pregnant women who were at risk of premature delivery
because of their HIV-status, and husbands deliberately separated from
their wives who had been evacuated for emergency medical care.
When I first met these people, what struck me was that they could
all fit in a large lecture hall. They could have been brought out on a
single airplane at any time through the exercise of the Attorney Gen-
eral's parole power. But instead they were being guarded, by some two
hundred soldiers, at a cost of millions of dollars to the American tax-
payer. When the press asked the INS why it would not release these
prisoners, the INS spokesman answered, "they're going to die anyway,
aren't they?" '3 5 By March 1993, the Guantanamo Haitians had become
desperate. They went on a hunger strike that lasted more then forty
days. They began to attempt suicide through hanging, throwing them-
selves on the barbed wire, and other devices. Nearly every day, some-
one would collapse from food deprivation or heat exhaustion, or at-
tempt suicide. After the Branch Davidian disaster in Waco, some
Haitians threatened a mass suicide, which we believed to be an entirely
credible threat.
We realized that publicizing the Haitians' plight was crucial to
35. Haitian Ctrs. Council v. Sale, 823 F. Supp. 1038 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (quoting
statements attributed to INS spokesman Duane "Duke" Austin).
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mobilizing public support. Our students began a hunger strike that was
later picked up by more than twenty law schools across the country. 6
Reverend Jesse Jackson and other African-American activists began
organizing mass arrests in various cities. Producer Jonathan Demme
and singer Harry Belafonte held press conferences. Actors Susan
Sarandon and Tim Robbins even mentioned the Haitians before a
worldwide audience while announcing an award at the Academy
Awards.
We soon realized that it was no longer enough simply to pursue
the right-to-counsel claim. The Haitians did not need lawyers; they
needed to be released. And so, on the eve of trial, we amended the
complaint directly to attack the legality of the conditions of the camp.
In short, we were prepared to try our own version of Korematsu v.
United States,37 the legality of the world's first HIV-concentration
camp.
In June, following a brilliant two-week trial masterminded by Joe
Tringali and Lucas Guttentag, we won a permanent injunction ordering
the release of the Guantanamo Haitians. Rejecting the government's
claims, Judge Johnson wrote:
If the Due Process Clause does not apply to the detainees at
Guantanamo, Defendants would have discretion deliberately to
starve or beat them, to deprive them of medical attention, to
return them without process to their persecutors, or to discrimi-
nate among them based on the color of their skin. 8
The Clinton administration did not seek a stay of Judge Johnson's
order.
I will not forget June 21, 1993, the day the last of the Guanta-
namo Haitians were released into the United States. Michael Ratner
and I met some of the Haitians at LaGuardia Airport in New York,
and escorted them through the immigration process. One of the Hai-
tians came to me and said, "Monsieur Harold, my lawyer. My name is
wrong! My name is wrong!" It turned out that when the Coast Guard
had picked him up months earlier, it had misspelled his name on his
identity bracelet. Now the INS was finally processing him into the
United States, still using the wrong name. My first instinct was to com-
plain and correct the spelling of his name, until I realized that all of his
36. See Nadine Brozan, A Fast in Support of Haitian Refugees Moves from Yale
to Harvard, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1993, at B6.
37. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
38. Haitian Ctrs. Council v. Sale, 823 F. Supp. 1028, 1042 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
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legal rights under the court order keyed off of his "new" name. I told
him, "This is your Ellis Island. This is your name now." He listened
quietly, then brightened. He said, "Yes! This is my name!," and went
off happily.
V. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION
June 21, 1993 did not end in total victory. On the same day, by a
vote of eight to one, the Supreme Court upheld the legality of the
forced-return policy and accepted the government's position that
neither the Refugee Act nor the Refugee Convention required that the
policy be terminated. Much as I admire Justice John Paul Stevens, his
opinion in Sale v. Haitian Centers Counci 39 ranks among the least per-
suasive I have read. 40
Justice Stevens first denied that the Government was circum-
venting legal prohibitions against forced "return," claiming that the
government was doing something other than "returning" Haitian refu-
gees."' Unfortunately, the Kennebunkport Order itself made explicit
that the Coast Guard was "[t]o return" Haitian vessels and their pas-
sengers to Haiti,42 precisely the act that the law forbade. Justice Ste-
vens similarly denied the relevance of the French version of the Refu-
gee Convention,4" which barred state actions to "refouler" Haitian
refugees, even though French newspapers were reporting that "[L]es
Etats-Unis ont decide de refouler directement les refugies recueillis par
la garde cotiere.""
Second, Justice Stevens concluded that since the statute was di-
rected to the Attorney General, it did not bind the President.' 5 In fact,
the Attorney General is the President's chief immigration officer, and
Congress had by statute removed the discretion of the Attorney Gen-
eral and her agents-including the Coast Guard-to use the method of
summary return.46
39. 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993).
40. For a fuller elaboration of this critique, see Koh, Reflections, supra note *
41. 113 S. Ct. at 2552.
42. See Executive Order No. 12,807, sec. 2(c)(3), 57 Fed. Reg. 23,133 (1992)
(appropriate directives will be issued "providing for the Coast Guard ... [t]o return
the vessel and its passengers to the country from which it came.").
43. See 113 S. Ct. at 2563-64.
44. Le bourbier haitien, LE MONDE, June 1, 1992 [The United States has decided
to directly return refugees collected by the coast guard.] (emphasis added).
45. 113 S. Ct. at 2559-60.
46. See 14 U.S.C. § 89(b) (1988) which states:
The officers of the Coast Guard insofar as they are engaged ... in enforcing
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Third, Justice Stevens presumed that Congress had not legislated
extraterritorially to protect refugees on the high seas, even though Con-
gress had enacted the Refugee Act specifically to implement an inter-
national human rights treaty that governs the movement of refugees
across borders.47 Moreover, if Congress had intended the statute to op-
erate extraterritorially to authorize interdiction of the Haitians, why
should a court presume that Congress did not intend the statute's pro-
tections to operate extraterritorially as well?
Finally, and most troubling, Justice Stevens recognized that the
drafters of the U.N. Refugee Convention "may not have contemplated
that any nation would gather fleeing refugees and return them to the
one country they had desperately sought to escape; such actions may
even violate the spirit of Article 33."48 Yet instead of construing the
statute's words consistently with that spirit, Justice Stevens construed
them deliberately to offend the spirit of the treaty the statute was
meant to execute.' 9 Ironically, Justice Stevens' impassioned dissent in
the Mexican kidnapping case"0 had argued that a bilateral extradition
treaty which did not explicitly prohibit kidnapping must bar it, because
such actions plainly violate the object and purpose of the treaty. Yet
one year later, he argued that a refugee treaty that did not explicitly
prohibit extraterritorial refoulement must permit it, even though such
actions similarly offend the treaty's object and purpose?5
VI. LESSONS
Looking back, one could hardly be surprised that we lost at the
Supreme Court. After all, since 1991, the Supreme Court had voted
against the Haitians on five separate occasions. 52 The Court's August
any law of the United States shall ... be deemed to be acting as agents of the
particular executive department ...charged with the administration of the
particular law ... and ... be subject to all the rules and regulations with
respect to the enforcement of that law.
47. See 113 S.Ct. at 2560-62.
48. Id. at 2565 (emphasis added).
49. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 340, T.S. No. 58 (1980), entered into force, Jan. 27, 1980, states
the hornbook principle that treaties must first be construed according to both their
ordinary meaning and their object and purpose.
50. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2201-02 (1992) (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
51. See 113 S. Ct. 2549.
52. In February 1992, the Court, by an identical 8-1 vote, had denied certiorari to
the Haitian Refugee Center's earlier challenge to the previous Bush Administration
policy toward Haitian refugees. Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498 (11th
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1992 vote staying our Second Circuit ruling effectively guaranteed that
the summary return policy would continue until final Supreme Court
resolution. Eleven months later, how could the Justices declare that the
policy that they had allowed to continue for nearly a year had been
illegal all along? Once Bill Clinton broke his promise, the swing Jus-
tices-Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Souter and O'Connor-must have
thought, "If Bill Clinton can live with this, so can we."
Was the case worth bringing? In my 1991 article, I had argued
that the test of transnational public law litigation is not favorable judg-
ments, but practical results: the norms declared, the political pressure
generated, the government practices abated, and the lives saved. By
this measure, we did pretty well.
On the negative side of the ledger, bad precedent was made, but
one that should be restricted to this particular historical episode. The
Haitian interdiction program is conducted pursuant to a unique execu-
tive agreement that permits our government to stop Haitian boats on
the high seas. 5 The recent United States actions arguably constitute a
material breach of that agreement." Under Article 60(1) of the Vi-
enna Convention of the Law of Treaties, "[a] material breach of a bi-
lateral treaty by one of the parties entitles the other to invoke the
breach as a ground for terminating the treaty or suspending its opera-
tion in whole or in part." Thus, were the Government of Haiti now to
declare the 1981 U.S.-Haiti Agreement either terminated or sus-
Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1245 (1992). The Court had twice denied stay
requests from Haitian refugee groups, Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Baker, 112 S. Ct. 1073
(1992); 112 S. Ct. 1245 (1992), and thrice intervened to stay lower court rulings favor-
ing the Haitians. Baker v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., 112 S. Ct. 1072 (1992); McNary v.
Haitian Ctrs. Council, 112 S. Ct. 1714 (1992); 113 S. Ct. 3 (1992).
53. Agreement Effected by Exchange of Notes, Sept. 23, 1981, U.S.-Haiti,
T.I.A.S. No. 10,241.
54. Article 60(3) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States
and International Organizations or between International Organizations, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF. 129/15 (1986), 25 I.L.M. 543 (1986), entered into force, Mar. 21, 1986, de-
clares that "A material breach of a treaty, for the purposes of this article, consists in..
. a repudiation of the treaty .. . [or] the violation of a provision essential to the accom-
plishment of the object or purpose of the treaty." The stated purpose of the U.S.-Haiti
Agreement was "the establishment of a cooperative program of interdiction and selec-
tive return to Haiti of certain Haitian migrants and vessels involved in illegal transport
of persons coming from Haiti." Agreement Effected by Exchange of Notes, Sept. 23,
1981, U.S.-Haiti, T.I.A.S. No. 10,241, 3559. The U.S. Government's summary repatri-
ation policy, as conducted since May 24, 1992, has unilaterally substituted a program
of interdiction and blanket return to Haiti of all Haitian migrants. This policy not only
exceeds the scope of Haitian consent under the 1981 agreement, but also plainly vio-
lates the object and purpose of the agreement.
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pended, that act would deprive the United States of any justification
under international law for stopping, boarding, inspecting, and re-
turning Haitian vessels to Haiti."
On the positive side of the precedential ledger, we won a district
court opinion ruling that aliens, even when they are held outside the
United States, retain due process rights to adequate medical and living
conditions and to assistance of counsel before being returned to their
persecutors.56 Although the Supreme Court ruling settles the legality of
the interdiction policy under domestic law, it in no way forecloses rul-
ings by international bodies that the policy violates international law.
Thus, our arguments provided a basis for future condemnation of the
government's policy by both the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights and the U.N. High Commissioner on Refugees. 57 More-
over, our suit kept political pressure on two Administrations to make
good on their promise to restore democracy in Haiti. The Haitian refu-
gees became a grassroots political issue about which ordinary citizens
became exercised. 58 Had the case died in the courts in February 1992,
there would have been no focal point around which such political pres-
sure could coalesce. Finally, and most important, we won the freedom
of the 310 Haitians held on Guantanamo. Most of them have now be-
55. Article 2(1) of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas, 13 U.S.T. 2312, and
Article 87 of the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/CONF
62/122; 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982) (which the United States has accepted as customary
international law) guarantee all state's vessels freedom of navigation on the high seas.
Except where acts of interference derive from powers conferred by treaty, a
warship which encounters a foreign merchant ship on the high seas is not
justified in boarding her unless there is reasonable ground for suspecting: (a)
that the ship is engaged in piracy; or (b) that the ship is engaged in slave
trade; or (c) that, though flying a foreign flag or refusing to fly its flag, the
ship is, in reality, of the same nationality as the warship.
Art. 22(1) of the 1958 Convention (emphasis added). The same legal principle is stated
in Art. 110 of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention and § 522(2) of the RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1986).
56. 823 F. Supp. 1028, 1041 (E.D.N.Y. 1993). We also won a preliminary injunc-
tion, later affirmed by the Second Circuit, to the same effect, which was later vacated
by the Supreme Court on other grounds. See Haitian Ctrs. Council v. McNary, 969 F.
2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1992), vacated as moot, 113 S. Ct. 3028 (1993).
57. At this writing, the Inter-American Commission is considering a petition chal-
lenging the Haitian interdiction program as a violation of the American Declaration of
the Rights and Duties of Man and the American Convention on Human Rights, OAS
Treaty No. 36. In March 1993, the Commission issued an interim Resolution adopting
Precautionary Measures and noting that the U.S. policy prevents the exercise by the
Haitians of the right to seek refuge. A final resolution is expected in the spring of 1994.
58. No more nice guy; Lani Guinier nomination, THE NATION, June 28, 1993, at
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gun new lives in America, filing asylum claims, beginning jobs, and
pursuing their education.
What did I learn from this experience? First, a lesson about cour-
age. Imagine yourself a Haitian, your relatives killed, your life shat-
tered, fleeing in a boat, captured, held under military guard for eigh-
teen months, living with people you have never met, then suddenly
finding out that you have an incurable disease. Would you have had the
strength to hold on in captivity for nearly two years, to band together,
to organize political activity, to demonstrate, to engage in hunger
strikes, and finally to come to the United States to start life again, not
knowing how much life you might have left?
I learned as much about courage from the Yale Law School stu-
dents who worked on this case. During the course of the litigation, they
testified before Congress, testified before the district court, prepared
and examined witnesses, helped write briefs to all levels of the federal
judiciary, took depositions, conducted document discovery, traveled to
Guantanamo to counsel our clients, dealt with national and interna-
tional media, negotiated with the INS and the military, all without pay
and little regard to their grades or professional futures.
I will not forget the day when the government was supposed to
produce important medical records from Guantanamo in New Haven,
Connecticut. We expected to have several days to examine the records.
On the day before the document production, a government lawyer
called and said that they would produce the documents the next morn-
ing in Miami, but for only twelve hours. While I was arguing with the
attorney, wondering how we could possibly deal with this situation, a
student passed in a note saying, "We're leaving for the airport." Five
students flew to Miami at their own expense, appeared the next morn-
ing and went through all the government documents. They uncovered
several "smoking guns" that we later used at trial. None of these stu-
dents had yet passed the bar, but nevertheless, they were honored by
the American Immigration Lawyers' Association as co-recipients of its
1992 Human Rights Award. If this case accomplished nothing else, it
has helped train some of the leading human rights lawyers of the next
generation.
Second, I learned something about how history repeats itself. Not
long ago, I wrote an article called Why the President (Almost) Always
Wins in Foreign Affairs.59 In it, I pointed to recurrent patterns of exec-
utive activism, congressional passivity, and judicial tolerance that push
59. 97 YALE L.J. 1255 (1988).
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presidents successfully to press the limits of law in foreign affairs.6" But
it was not until I was sitting at counsel table during the argument
before the Justices that the ironic truth of that analysis became clear. I
heard our government assert claims of national security and national
emergency in support of its demand for presidential power: the Kore-
matsu argument being made against the Haitians. I heard the Chinese
Exclusion argument about sovereignty and inherent power to protect
our borders invoked against the Haitians. The Government cited U.S.
ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, an egregious case that had declared
that "[w]hatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due pro-
cess as far as an alien denied entry is concerned."'"
As I read the Court's opinion months later, I began to wonder
whether our Supreme Court is truly equipped to deal with the post-
Cold War world. At a time when the rest of the world looks to interna-
tional law to spur trade, commerce, migration, and democratization,
why is our Supreme Court so fixated inward? Why does the Court re-
flexively defer to presidential prerogative, even when that power is
wielded in the face of contrary statutory and treaty law and with bald
disrespect for human rights?
Third, I finally understand what it means to be a discrete and in-
sular minority. If you are a black Haitian with HIV, fleeing for your
life, you are about as discrete and insular as one gets. Poor, black, sick
Haitian aliens have scant support in the press, few powerful friends,
and minimal representation in Congress. And so it was possible for the
United States government to work a succession of human rights abuses
upon that beleaguered group--due process violations, summary return,
and arbitrary detention-without having to face the consequences.
Finally, I learned something about myself. When our case began, I
was teaching international law, human rights, presidential power and
civil procedure. As the litigation unfolded, each of these issues became
prominent, and I began to wonder whether it was really a coincidence
that I had become involved. As I prepared for the oral argument before
the Court, it finally dawned on me that the Haitian saga is not some-
one else's saga. It is my story.
When the case began, I had never met a Haitian, and had known
very few people with HIV. It was tempting to see the Haitians' experi-
60. I later expanded upon those themes. See HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NA-
TIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR
(1990). See also David Cole, Youngstown v. Curtiss-Wright, 99 YALE L.J. 2063
(1990) (reviewing KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION).
61. 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950), cited in Transcript, supra note 26, at 4 (oral argu-
ment of Deputy Solicitor General Maureen Mahoney).
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ence as unconnected to my own experience as an Asian-American. But
as the case unfolded, so many links emerged. Their dashed hope of
democracy reminded me of my father's sadness in Korea. In the faces
of the Haitian boat people, I saw Vietnamese boat people I had known.
The Haitian exclusion evoked the Chinese exclusion, and their callous
internment recalled the Japanese internment.
I realized that the Haitian story reduces to a story about "we" and
"they." Our government was able to depersonalize the Haitians be-
cause Americans wanted to believe that the Haitians are not us. After
all, if these sick people on Guantanamo or these desperate people in
Port-au-Prince are somebody else, they are not our problem. And after
all, don't we have enough problems?
But if you have ever been a refugee, or if your forbears were refu-
gees, then, in fact, you are Haitian. If you ever lived in an internment
camp or knew someone in an internment camp, then you are a Haitian.
If you have ever known someone shunned because they have HIV, then
you are Haitian. And if you ever believed-even for one second-that
the words on the Statue of Liberty are not just words, but a sacred
promise, then you are Haitian.
Of course, the Haitians are old news now. At this writing, our
Coast Guard continues to return fleeing Haitians to a brutal regime
that maintains its grip on power. Supporters of Aristide continue to be
murdered on the streets of Haiti, even while our government grabs Chi-
nese refugees in the Gulf of Mexico. As all of this happens, it is easy to
say, "That's not me. That's not us. When they start doing it to 'our'
people, then we'll worry about it."
At the close of my argument before the Supreme Court, I decided
to say, "Your Honor [s], . . . ours is a Nation of refugees. Most of our
ancestors came here by boat. If they could do this to the Haitians, they
could do this to any of us.""2 By so saying, I wanted the Justices to
remember that the Haitians are us. I wanted to remind them that by
living this case, our nation has relived its past. I wanted to remember,
as my father did, what it means to love the law and be faithful to it:
never to forget that ours is a nation of refugees, a nation committed to
the rule of law and not of individuals, a nation that still believes in
principle, and not just politics.
62. Transcript, supra note 26, at 22.
